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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff-Respondent

- vs. DONALD HANSEN

Case No.
10999

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Donald Hansen, appeals from a
conviction on jury trial for the crime of assault with
a deadly weapon with intent to commit robbery.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was convicted on jury trial for
the charged offense of assault with a deadly weapon
with intent to commit robbery.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction in
the lower court, or, in the alternative, a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts
as contained in the brief of appellant.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
AN AUTOMATIC WEAPON WHICH CAN BE
LOADED WITHIN A MATTER OF MOMENTS
IS A DEADLY WEAPON WHEN THE OFFENSE
INVOLVED IS ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY
WEAPON WITH INTENT TO COMMIT ROBBERY.

The appellant asserts as a basis for the relief
he seeks on appeal the refusal of the trial court to
instruct the jury as requested by appellant. The requested instruction which was refused provides:
You are instructed that before you can find the
defendant guilty of the grime of Assault with a
Deadly Weapon with the Intent to Commit Robbery, you must find beyond a reasonable [doubt]
that defendant did in fact use a deadly weapon.
You are urther instructed that an unloaded gun is
not a deadly weapon. The State must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the gun held by Don Hansen in this case was loaded at the time. If it is reasonable to believe that the gun was not loaded, you
should acquit the defendant." (Emphasis Added.)

The instruction in question demands an acquittal
if it is found by the jury that the defendant's gun
was unloaded, the conclusion being that an unload·
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ed gun is not a "deadly weapon" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 76-51-3 (1953).
That an unloaded gun may constitute a "deadly
weapon" has been recognized by the courts. People v. White, 115 Cal. App.2d 828, 253 P.2d 108 (1953).
See 79 ALR2d 1412, 1417. Generally this recognition
is based on the fact that an unloaded gun may be
used_as a bludgeon and may, therefore, be a "deadly" weapon, depending on the circumstances of
size, weight; and manner of use. See I Wharton,
Criminal Law and Procedure § 361 (12th ed. 1957).
An unloaded gun need not actually be used as
a bludgeon in order for it to be classified as a "deadly" weapon. It is sufficientif the gun may be so used,
as was stated in People v. White, 116 Cal. App.2d
828, 253 P.2d 108 (1953):
If a person is armed with a pistol at the time he
perpetrates a crimes, this evidence is sufficient to
sustain a finding by the trier of fact that he was
armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon, even
though it was not loaded.

Thus, an instruction that absolutely precludes
a finding that an unloaded gun is a deadly weapon
is improper and the trial court did not err in refusing
to give the instruction in question.
Assuming, which the respondent does not, that
the actual or attempted use of the gun as a bludgeon
is not involved, and that the gun is deadly only with
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respect to its inherent capacity as a firearm to inflict
death or serious bodily harm, it is submitted by respondent that the trial court did not err in instructin'J
the jury with respect to that which constitutes a
"deadly weapon" as that term is used in Utah Code
Ann. § 76-51-3 (1953). The court's instruction number
thirteen provided:
... A 'deadly weapon' as that term is used in these
instructions, means a weapon which in the particular manner used is then and there capable of producing death or great bodily harm. A loaded gun
capable of being fired, or a gun capable of being
fired and which can then and there be immediately
loaded within a matter of moments, is a deadly
weapon.

The appellant attacks that portion of the instruction which implicitly dictates that an unloaded gun ,
is a deadly weapon if it can be "immediately loaded
within a matter of moments." The attack is based on
those cases which have held that a gun is a deadly
weapon even if certain mechanical movements must
be made before the gun is capable of being fired,
if the movements and the possible ultimate discharge of the cartridge can be effected "instantly."
People v. Pearson. 150 Cal. App.2d 811, 311 P.2d 142
(1957); People v. Simpson. 134 Cal. App. 646, 25 P.2d
1008 (1933). Cf. People v. Young, 105 Cal. App.2d
612, 233 P.2d 155 (1951). Apparently it is the appel·
lant's contention that an "immediate" loading "within a matter of moments" is something less than the
law demands as a basis for a determination that a
"deadly weapon" was used since the capability d
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producing a discharge of the cartridge would not be
reached "instantly."
Respondent cannot subscribe to such an artificial distinction in cases of this nature. Historically,
in the days when the muzzle loader was the ultimate
weapon, it might have been of logical significance
to determine if all steps immediately preceding the
actual pulling of the trigger had been accomplished.
This might have been important in that a failure to
accomplish such steps prior to confrontation would
have afforded the indiviidual at whom the gun was
directed the opportunity of retreating or disarming
the assailant.
The modern automatic weapon presents a context much different than that described above insofar as the gun being "unloaded" might be relevant.
With a clip containing ammunition readily available, all things necessary for bringing the weapon
to the brink of firing can be completed in such a
short span of time that the opportunity for safety is
not presented to the victim as might be the case
with other less sophisticated weapons.
A distinction drawn between an "instant" capacity to fire and one which is "immediate" and
"within a matter of moments" is at best slight. The
description of the mechanical process which would
have been necessary to discharge a cartridge (appellant's brief P. 8), assuming the clip was not in the
gun, is sophistic in its portrayal of the process as
extended and time-consuming. A use of automatic
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weapons . particularly those of the type used by appellant, clearly demonstrates that the entire operation is of such brief duration that it is inappropriate
to argue that a "deadly weapon" was not used.

In determining whether a deadly weapon has ,
been used in the perpetration of a crime, attention
should be directed to the totality of the circumstances
rather than to arbitrary standards which have become outmoded. If the potential effective use of the
weapon is the same whether the clip is in the gun ,
or can be inserted quickly, then a classification cf
the weapon as "deadly" should logically follow in
both cases. That the clip containing live rounds was
readily at hand is not disputed in this case.
Finally, it must be noted that generally those
cases which have held that an unloaded gun is not
a deadly weapon have so held where the offense
involved was "assault with a deadly weapon."
It is submitted by respondent that a distinction
must be drawn between that which consitutes a
"deadly weapon" as anticipated by the offense of
mere "assault with a deadly weapon," see Utah
Code Ann. § 76-7-6 (1953) and that which can be
considered as a "deadly weapon" within the offense
of "assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit robbery," see Utah Code Ann. § 76-51-3 (1953).
It is clear that what may not be a "deadly
weapon" in one context may be a "deadly weapon''
in another. Thus, while the general rule appears to
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be that an unloaded gun, when considered as a
firearm, is not a deadly weapon when the charge is
"assault with a deadly weapon," an unloaded gun
may be a deadly weapon when some other criminal
offense is involved. Thus, an unloaded gun may be
a "deadly weapon" within those statutes denouncing the carrying and concealing of such weapons.
People v. Ekberg, 94 Cal. App.2d 613, 211 P.2d 316
(1949). Similarly, being unloaded does not take a
gun out of the "deadly weapon" class under those
statutes proscribing the exhibition of such weapons.
Cittadino v. State, 199 Miss. 235, 24 So2d 93 (1945).
And an unloaded gun is a "deadly weapon" within
the meaning of statutes establishing first degree
robbery, i.e., robbery perpetrated while one is
armed with a deadly weapon. E.g., People v. Navarro, 212 Cal. App.2d 299, 27 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1963).
See generally 79 ALR2d 1412 (1961).
An examination of the various forms of criminal
assault which involve the use of a deadly weapon
reveals that, where a firearm is the weapon in question, the state of being unloaded is relevant only
with respect to certain assaults.
Thus, where the offense of "assault with a deadly weapon" is under consideration, the question of
whether the gun is loaded or not becomes highly
relevant. The gravamen of the offense is the use of
a dangerous or "deadly" weapon "with intent to
hurt." See 1 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure
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§ 361 (12th ed. 1957); 92 A.L.R.2d 635 (1963) and cases
cited. If the gun is unloaded the offense is incomplete since, depending on the jurisdiction, either or
both the intent to harm and the requisite present
ability to inflict the harm would be lacking. See 79
A.L.R.2d 1412, 1418, 1421 (1961).

Similarly, where the offense involved is "assault
with the intent to commit murder" or "to do bodily
harm" by the use of a deadly weapon, the use of an
unloaded gun negates criminal responsibility, the
reason being that the necessary intent is nonexistent
or that the accused is incapable of effecting the desired result.
However, contrary to those assaults where the
intent to harm or kill and the present ability to do so
are involved, the unloaded status of the gun is irrelevant where the offense charged is "assault with
a deadly weapon with intent to commit robbery."
The intent is not to actually hurt or kill the subject
of the assault. Rather the intent is to create such fear
and apprehension in the victim that he will give up '
his property without physical resistance. The emphasis is transferred from the status of the gun as it
affects the intent and the present ability to inflict
harm to the creation of the apprehension in the victim. And, of course, the apprehension may be created irrespective of the fact that the weapon is unloaded.
This distinction based on the nature of the specific type of assault involved was recognized and
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ably discussed in McNamara v. People, 24 Colo. 61,
48 Pac. 541 (1897) wherein the court stated:
This diversity of opinion [as to the effect of a gun
being unloaded] has arisen in cases wherein the
alleged assault was made towards the perpetration
of an offense that could not possibly be consum. mated unless the firearm was loaded, -such as
murder or bodily injury. And we find no case wherein the facts essential to support the allegation of
an assault with intent to commit robbery or a like
crime is discussed or determined; this being an
offense that may be committed by intimidation, as
well as by actual force. The intimidation of a person may be just as effectually accomplished by an
apparent, as well as an actual, ability to inflict the
menaced injury; and therefore the reason of the
rule adopted in the cases holding proof of actual
ability necessary is not applicable to a case of this
character.

The unloaded status of the gun not being de±erminative in cases of this type, the trial court did
not err in denying the defendant's requested instruction or in instructing the jury as it did.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW TESTIMONY· CONCERN-·
ING AN ACCIDENT ALLEGEDLY CAUSING
BRAIN DAMAGE. TO THE APPELLANT.

Council for the appellant attempted ot elicit from
the appellant testimony regarding an accident in
which the appellant was involved. Mr> Ross ask.eel:
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"Now, Mr. Hansen, back in 1957 did you have an
accident"? An objection to the question was sustained by the trial court. (R. 138). Counsel for the -appellant later attempted to explain the relevance of
the question. Apparently the appellant fell down a
flight of stairs in 1957. He allegedly suffered brain ,
damage, and a blood clot on the brain resulted
which necessitated an operation for removal of the
blood clot. As a result of the operation, appellant's
tolerance for alcoholic beverages allegedly was reduced causing him to black out and engage in irrational behavior upon the consumption of lesser
amounts of alcoholic beverages. It is not disputed
that appellant had been drinking the evening on
which the acts in question occurred. The evidence
of the prior accident is purported to further substantiate the appellant's assertion that he "blacked out"
for the period in question and, that he, therefore,
had no specific intent to commit the crime for which
he was convicted.
The nearly universal rule that voluntary intoxication is no defense to a crime has been codified in
this state. Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-22 (1953). An
exception to this rule is the relief from certain criminal responsibility which is afforded when the Offense requires what has been described as a "specific intent" and the intoxication negates such an
intent.
In attempting to prove intoxication and thus a
negation of the requisite specific intent, evidence
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introduced must be such that it relates to the state
of intoxication of the appellant. Was the proffered
evidence in this case such that it reasonably related
to the question of whether the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the commission of the offense?
It was assumed by appellant that the operation
on his brain directly affected his capacity to consume alcohoiic beverages without suffering certain
adverse affects such as black outs or loss of memory. There is nothing to indicate that the type of operation sustained by the appellant is in any way rela,ted to a tolerance for alcoholic beverages other
than expressions by those not qualified to speak on
such technical matters. Without such a showing, the
evidence is irrelevant and was properly excluded,
for it could not then be inferred from the fact of the
operation that the defendant was intoxicated on the
night in question. See generally 1 Wharton, Criminal
Evidence § 148 (1955).

The operation occurred in 1957 and was considered to be too remote in point of time from the
acts in question, Remoteness is a matter left to the
sound discretion of the trial judge. Evans v. Gais·
ford. 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952).
Assuming the proffered evidence was admissable, it was not prejudicial error to exclude such evidence. The record is replete with testimony concerning the possible intoxication of the appellant.
If the jury had been inclined to believe that a spe-
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cific intent to commit robbery was nonexistent, there
was sufficient evidence on which it could have based
such a belief.
CONCLUSION

An automatic firearm which can be loaded within a matter of moments is a "deadly weapon" when
the offense charged is assault with a deadly weapon
with intent to commit robbery.
The exclusion of the evidence of a prior accident is not grounds for reversal. The evidence is too
remote in point of time and does not relate reasonably to the question of intoxication. The exclusion
was not prejudicial if the evidence was admissable.
Respondent urges, therefore, that the conviction
of the appellant be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
ROBERT J. STANSFIELD
Assistant Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

